Driven by China's increasing global influence, China-Brazil relations have deepened significantly in the 21st century; for Brazil, this bilateral relationship has become one of the most important aspects of its foreign relations. This article aims at analysing how Brazil's foreign policy towards China was made and implemented during the eight years of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's presidency, and the first four years of Dilma Rousseff's presidency. While scholars agree that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not exclusively dominate this policy, little is known about which state and non-state actors were involved, how and why they interacted, and how their interactions influenced policy choices. The article starts by identifying the actors that played a significant role in formulating Brazil's China policy. Next, drawing on the concept of network governance, it explores the processes and mechanisms that governed the interactions among them. It concludes with an assessment of the democratic quality of this policy area.
Introduction
The first decade of the 21 st century marked a new phase in China's economic and political rise. After more than three decades of sustained economic growth, China started to expand its economic and political influence across the globe. Even though this 'going global' strategy had been in the making for several years, it only materialised in the 2000s (Shambaugh 2013: 6) . One of the central elements of China's global strategy was the strengthening of relations with other developing countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Brazil, the largest economy in Latin America, politically influential, and the sponsor of several regional institutions, was particularly exposed to China's increasing regional and global influence. This article will analyse how the response to China's new global role was formulated and implemented during the eight years of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva's presidency (2003 Silva's presidency ( -2010 , and the first four years of Dilma Rousseff's presidency (2011 Rousseff's presidency ( -2014 This analysis is based on two interrelated premises. The first is the agency of the state in the international system. While structural dynamics such as market forces, increasing bilateral interdependence, and the international distribution of power are relevant, the analysis departs from the idea that they provide the context in which purposeful states act. Indeed, the agency of the state is at the centre of Hill's definition of foreign policy, which he describes as 'the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations. Policy is the "sum" of these official relations […] and it implies conscious intentions and coordination' (Hill 2002: 3-5) .
If we assume that states are indeed able to choose and, to some extent, creatively construct their relations with other states, it is legitimate to ask how they arrive at the choices they make about these relations. This implies, as Alden and Aran suggest, looking not only at the 'actors involved in the state's formal decision-making apparatus, but also the variety of sub-national sources of influence upon state foreign policy' (Alden and Aran 2012: 1) . This, then, is the second premise: states are not unitary, and it is therefore necessary to open the 'black box' and assess how their actions are influenced by their internal dynamics. These two premises serve as the points of departure for analysing the domestic conditions and factors influencing Brazil's China policy in the 21 st century.
Other scholars have addressed this theme, but the role of domestic actors in the formulation of Brazil's China policy is still insufficiently understood. While Ramanzini Júnior and Ribeiro (2013: 175) regard the involvement of domestic actors in the policy process as 'limited', Barbosa and Mendes (2008) , Biato Junior (2010), Neves (2011), and Spektor (2011) confirm the relevance of domestic politics, but leave some questions unanswered: which actors were involved in the policy process, and which were excluded? What types of resources were relevant to policy formulation, and how were they distributed among domestic actors?
This article seeks to provide answers to these questions, and fill this gap in the literature, by drawing on a specific theoretical framework. More specifically, it uses the concept of network governance to shed light on the mechanisms through which domestic politics influenced Brazil's policy towards China. In general terms, governance means the way in which public policy-making is organised -that is, how actors, whether state or non-state, contribute to the political regulation of social affairs and the provision of common goods (Mayntz 1998) . Given its centrality, the examination of any public policy should start with this concept. However, in foreign policy analysis, modes of governance are rarely discussed and theorised. As a result, most studies of foreign policy-making take for granted the mode of governance that emerged with the establishment of modern public administration in the beginning of the 20 th century, in terms of which policy (government and bureaucracy) was meant to be separated from politics (society). However, this mode of governance has gone through several changes since the 1970s, intended to create more space for non-state actors in public policy-making. In this context, the concept of network governance makes it possible to study foreign policy-making by taking into consideration this shift from 'government to governance' -the 'governance turn', to use the term coined by Risse (2013) . Drawing on this analytical framework, the article argues that state and non-state actors in Brazil recurrently interacted in an attempt to jointly govern relations with China.
The analysis is based on qualitative field work as well as desktop work. Secondary sources include articles from books, journals and newspapers. The field work was conducted in China (from August 2011 to January 2012) and, mostly, in Brazil (from November 2012 to December 2012), and consisted of face-to-face interviews. The interviewees were officials in the ministries of foreign affairs and trade, representatives of the export sector and of trade unions, and experts on Brazil's foreign policy. All the interviews informed the research as well as the analysis. Seventeen interviews were conducted, five of which are quoted.
The study starts with a discussion of the analytical framework, aimed at defining the concept of network governance and inserting it into the analysis of the domestic sources of foreign policy. Next, the transition of modes of governance in Brazil is analysed. Following this, the theoretical considerations are used as a framework for studying the conditions under which domestic actors interacted to make Brazil's policy towards China. The analysis largely focuses on Lula da Silva's administration, followed by an assessment of the continuities and changes during Rousseff's first term. The study concludes with a summary of the main findings.
Domestic sources of foreign policy: a view from network governance
The idea that the international system consists of unitary states whose behaviour is exclusively shaped by structural forces dominated international relations thinking for most of the 20 th century. Only after the publication of seminal works by Snyder et al. (1962) and Rosenau (1967) , domestic dynamics started to gain relevance as an explaining variable of states' international actions. However, this relevance waned in the 1970s and 1980s as systemic explanations of international relations, led by the structural realism of Kenneth Waltz (1979) , gained prominence.
The end of the Cold War contributed to a revival of domestic variables in international relations research. The collapse of the bipolar system accelerated economic liberalisation, democratisation, and the spread of information and telecommunications technologies (ICT), bolstering the interconnections among states. In this context, almost every policy area that states had to deal with gained an 'international dimension', leading to a pluralisation of actors with a 'stake' in international affairs (Macleod 2002) . Therefore, national societies became not only more integrated, but also more fragmented.
Against this background, several authors argued that the specific choices of states about their foreign relations could only be properly understood by considering the role of domestic actors (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993; Milner 1997; Moravcsik 1997) . These actors were regarded as relevant for two reasons. First, since the way in which states respond to globalisation has effects (either relative or absolute) on societies, domestic actors are interested in shaping the direction of states' decisions. Second, domestic actors have several types of resources that are relevant to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. According to Moravcsik (1994: 1) , there are four types of resources: institutions (the procedures by which domestic decisions are made); information or expertise (political and technical knowledge); initiative (the authority to introduce -or to block the introduction of -issues onto the domestic agenda); and ideas (labelling the problem, or the supply of legitimate ideological justification for specific policies). Financial resources are also important.
Even though the authors mentioned above were instrumental for a better understanding of the domestic sources of foreign policy, they rarely referred to changes in state governance as one of the conditions for the increasing participation of domestic actors in foreign policy-making after the Cold War. This is because studies of foreign policy tend to take as given the bureaucratic-hierarchical mode of governance in which state actors (executive, legislative and bureaucratic) are the only relevant policy-makers. The nature of the state and the modes of governance underlying foreign policy-making are rarely discussed. However, such a discussion is essential because the mode of governance in place -either based on hierarchy, markets, or networks -determines how the public policy-making process and state-society relations are organised. This means that it has a selective effect in that it helps to determine the constellation of actors that can be legitimately included in the policy-making process.
The hierarchical bureaucratic mode of governance, which organised state-society relations across the world during most of the 20 th century, determined that the executive and bureaucratic arms of the Daniel Cardoso state had to be insulated from society in order to 'avoid the collective irrationalities of the electorate and prevent strong, organized interests from taking control of state policy. The goal was to increase the efficiency of public policies by insulating them from politics' (Bevir 2010: 25-26) . In this conception, public policies were formulated within the state apparatus, and then imposed on society.
However, this approach has lost ground since the 1970s, opening the way to patterns of governance based on markets and networks. In the face of the challenges brought by globalisation and the fragmentation of political and social life, network governance arose as a way to bring together the resources of interdependent state and non-state actors in order to increase the possibility of reducing uncertainty, overcoming complexity, and increasing the efficiency of policies (Sørensen and Torfing 2009). 2 While, during the bureaucratic-hierarchical period, the goal was to limit the role of non-state actors who could only influence policy from the 'outside', network governance aims at allowing those actors to work alongside state actors in shaping policy from 'inside'. In this sense, governance through networks means that there is a constellation of 'interdependent yet autonomous actors engaged in institutionalized processes of public governance based on negotiated interactions and joint decision making ' (Sørensen and Torfing 2009: 237) . These networks between state and non-state actors tend to be horizontal, in that they have no formal leader; voluntary, in that actors choose to participate, and can leave it at any point; and reciprocal, in that actors exchange resources, and expect to get something out of the network (Sikkink 2009: 230) . 3 However, as noted by Börzel (2010) , modes of governance build on, rather than completely replace, one another. This means that networks usually operate informally under the supervision or management of the state, in the 'shadow of hierarchy'. In this sense, the state is a manager, concerned with 'metagovernance', or the governance of governance (Marsh 2008) .
Brazilian scholars have done a lot of work on the impact of globalisation, liberalisation and democratisation on the process of making and implementing foreign policy (Figueira 2009; Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro 2010; Pinheiro and Milani 2012; de Faria 2012; de Faria, Lopes and Casarões 2013) . These authors agree that, due to those three factors, the separation between the domestic and international dimensions was increasingly blurred, paving the way for the pluralisation of actors in Brazil's foreign policy-making. This loosened the strong grip of the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE, or Itamaraty) on the policy process, which became more plural, politicised, competitive, and messy. Yet these changes in Brazil's foreign policy-making process have been rarely analysed from a governance perspective. The dialogue between foreign policy analysis and governance studies is particularly useful in the case of Brazil because the historic insulation of Itamaraty represents one of the clearest examples of the bureaucratic hierarchy paradigm in action. Hence it is relevant to assess how the changes (either material or ideational) to governance in Brazil since the 1990s affected the traditional foreign policy-making process.
In the next section, drawing on the analytical framework, the evolution of Brazil's modes of governance and their effects on the formulation of foreign policy will be analysed. This step is relevant in order to assess, once the article turns to the case study, the structural conditions underlying the formulation of Brazil's foreign policy towards China, namely the room for the legitimate participation of non-state actors in the policy process.
From bureaucratic hierarchy to network governance
The bureaucratic-hierarchical mode of governance in Brazil started in the 1930s. In 1938, the government created the Administrative Department of Public Service in order to centralise public policy-making, and insulate it from society (Silva and Amaral 2007: 10) . This reform was crucial for Itamaraty since it created some of the foundations of its insulation, namely the establishment of a diplomatic academy, and the building of a specific ethos within the ministry (Figueira 2009: 137; de Faria 2008: 81) . From the 1970s onwards, after several decades of consolidation and pre-eminence, the efficacy of this mode of governance was increasingly questioned. This process was not confined to Brazil; there was a worldwide trend towards scepticism about the weight of the state in the economy and society. As shown in the previous section, the general assessment was that, due to the increasing complexity of world affairs as a result of globalisation and the emergence of organised civil society in the 1970s, states could no longer govern efficiently on their own, necessitating a transition to more modern forms of governance (Sørensen and Torfing 2007). Neoliberalism and its application to public administration through what became known as 'New Public Management' emerged as the first response to these concerns about state governance (Bevir 2010: 67) . The emergence of neoliberalism converged with what Samuel Huntington labelled the 'third wave of democratization' -that is, a process of democratisation in more than 30 countries between 1974 and 1990 (Huntington 1991: 12) . These two trends, combined with globalisation and the end of the Cold War, provided the backdrop to the changes in Brazil's governance from the late 1970s onwards.
The first attempts to revise the centralised and bureaucratic nature of the Brazilian state were the 1979 National Plan of Debureaucratisation, and the 1988 Constitution (Silva and Amaral 2007: 10 Regarding foreign policy-making, the reforms did not profoundly change the bureaucratic-hierarchical model on which the MRE was based (Figueira 2009: 154) . However, several changes were introduced that were intended to loosen the institution's grip on the process, bringing it closer to the network governance model. (Cason and Power 2009: 121) . Furthermore, several ministries established dedicated offices to deal with international linkages. Even though this was not a novelty, as noted by Silva et al. (2010: 17) , this trend grew stronger from the 1990s onwards because of the increasing interconnection between domestic and international agendas in various policy areas (Figueira 2009: 156-157; de França and Sanchez 2009; Pinheiro and Milani 2013: 17) .
However, the biggest achievement, according to those involved in the process of reforming the Brazilian state in the mid-1990s, was in the realm of ideas. capacity to efficiently achieve results, the state has to widen the room for dialogue, partnership and co-responsibility with society' (Brazil 2004: 7) . According to Cervo, Lula da Silva continued and deepened the notion of the 'logistic state' which served as the foundation of Cardoso's reforms. In Cervo's words, the state is 'logistic' because it 'recovers the developmental strategic planning, and serves as support and legitimisation of the initiatives from other economic and social actors, to which it transfers responsibility and power' (Cervo 2012: 37) .
Itamaraty soon began to address its goal of promoting the involvement of other state as well as non-state actors in foreign policy-making. In his inaugural address as minister of foreign affairs, Celso Amorim stated that 'to define the national interest in each specific situation, I will strengthen the coordination with other government bodies and with several sectors of society -workers, businessmen, intellectuals -and civil society entities' (Amorim 2003) . This intention was put into to practice through two reforms (2004 and 2006) which established more channels of communication with other actors, and further fragmented the structure of the ministry by creating new thematic sections (Figueira 2009: 144) .
As Figueira (2009) points out, the shift from the bureaucratic-hierarchical mode of governance to network governance in Brazil's foreign policy-making was incomplete, and the two modes coexisted during Lula da Silva's administration. Even though Itamaraty remained a hierarchical and cohesive body based on a strong professional ethos, it no longer fully centralised the policy-making process, having instead to operate within a network of state and non-state actors (Figueira 2009: 163) . 5 The institution remained influential, as attested by a cable from the US Ambassador to Brazil sent to the Department of State in Washington,DC (US Embassy 2009) as well as studies on this topic (de Faria 2012: 347; Figueira 2009: 192) , but the need for its 'insulation' in order to have an efficient foreign policy vanished with the changes in the intersubjective understanding of how the policy process should be organised. The recipe for efficiency was no longer bureaucratic insulation, but co-ordination within a network of state and non-state actors. As noted by one of Souza's interviewees, 'the bureaucratic isolation of Itamaraty, which once allowed it to maintain its quality, became an obstacle ' (de Souza 2001: 87) .
To summarise, after Collor de Mello there was an intentional shift towards network governance, which, alongside globalisation, economic liberalisation and democratisation, formed the basis for the reconfiguration of public policy-making in Brazil. Under these circumstances, the choices of the Brazilian government about the conduct of its international affairs were more likely to be influenced by the interaction between domestic actors.
Drawing on these insights, the next section traces the participation of domestic actors in the making of Brazil's China policy during Lula da Silva's two terms in office, and the first four years of Rousseff's first term.
Network governance and the making of Brazil's foreign policy on China
Sino-Brazilian relations were limited until the 2000s. This changed as China acceded to the WTO in 2001, and started to extend its influence. In Latin America, Brazil stood out as one of the countries most heavily influenced by China's 'going global' strategy. 6 Despite the considerable geographical and cultural distance, Brazil became relevant for China because of its economic and political features: resource-rich, large domestic market, technological sophistication in several sectors, and significant regional influence (Cardoso 2015) . While a few initiatives were undertaken during Cardoso's term, it was mostly up to the next administration to find ways of coping with China's growing stature.
Lula da Silva's presidency (2003 Silva's presidency ( -2010 An analysis of the formulation of Brazil's policy towards China during Lula da Silva's two terms in office (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) Even though Itamaraty had to share foreign policy-making with other actors, several institutional mechanisms were put in place to ensure that it would still play a central role. 22 For example, at the end of Lula da Silva's second term, a 'China desk' was created under Itamaraty's department of international finance to facilitate co-ordination with other domestic actors about relations with China, especially in the areas of economics and finance.
23
CEBC and ICOOI were naturally pro-China. For them, the Asian country was mostly a promising partner rather than a discouraging competitor (CEBC n/d). Therefore, they believed the Brazilian authorities should invest more in promoting bilateral relations than in . 24 This decision was also opposed in the Brazilian Congress, and several members, notably members of the largest opposition party, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), tried to have the decision revoked (Cardoso 2015) . The efforts of these actors were enough to encourage the Brazilian government not to fully recognise China as a 'market economy' at that point. 25 Besides the 'market economy status' issue, FIESP and CNI put also strong pressure on Lula da Silva's administration to implement specific measures against an 'imminent invasion of Chinese products in Brazil' (Cordeiro 2004). As a result, in 2005 they both asked the administration to introduce 'safeguards' against certain Chinese products (Nunes 2005; Agência Brasil 2005 (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) Despite the leadership change in 2011, the government's goal of intensifying relations with China continued. Rousseff's state visit to China in April 2011 was among the first of her presidency (Hugueney 2011) . COSBAN, the main bilateral organisation, convened more often during Rousseff's first term (in 2012, 2013 and 2015) than during Lula da Silva's two terms (in 2006 only).
Following Rousseff's ascent to the presidency, the domestic context for making and implementing policy on China did not change substantially; the main actors involved in the policy process remained the same. However, two aspects should be noted. The first was the government's effort to improve co-ordination of the policy process. To this end, in 2011, Rousseff decided to strengthen the 'China Desk' by transforming it into an interministerial group, headed both by the MRE and MDIC (Correio 24horas 2011). According to Alessandro Teixeira, this represented an institutional innovation since it was the first time that an interministerial group was created to study a single country (Correio 24horas 2011).
The second was FIESP's shift from a defensive to a proactive posture about the 'China effect'. In a report released in 2014, FIESP stated that, even though the relationship remained problematic in some ways, the Brazilian government should regard China as a strategic priority, and adopt a pragmatic approach towards it (FIESP 2014: 1) . This shift in FIESP's understanding of China increased the room for co-operation among domestic actors in Brazil, which had been opened in 2007 as CNI joined the network that prepared and implemented 'Agenda China'.
While the views of FIESP and other actors had converged, tensions between Vale and the government, which had already existed to some extent during the Lula da Silva years, 28 intensified during Rousseff's presidency, leading eventually to the dismissal of Roger Agnelli as Vale's CEO in April 2011 (Mozee 2011) . As one of Vale's shareholders, the state was able to enforce a change in the company's management. 29 This shows that the co-operation between actors within and outside the state apparatus can also be hierarchical, since the government can use its authority to resolve conflicts of interest.
Conclusion
This study shows that the making of Brazil's China policy during the Lula da Silva administration and the first four years of the Rousseff administration involved a wide array of actors both inside and outside the state apparatus. The study identified these actors, and analysed their interactions. In fact, besides the MRE, traditionally the most engaged actor in Brazil's foreign policy, other actors such as the president, other ministries, state agencies, the development bank, state-owned and private companies, NGOs, consulting firms, peak associations, business councils and influential individuals participated, in some capacity, in the policy process.
This corresponded to the emergent pattern of rule in Brazil, which was based on network governance instead of the bureaucratic-hierarchical model. Even though several actors were involved in the policy process, the MRE, in lock-step with the presidency, continued to play a central role in managing the network. This shows that the making and implementation of Brazil's policy towards China took place in the 'shadow of hierarchy', combining, therefore, hierarchical and network forms of governance. This effort to co-ordinate the network through a certain degree of hierarchy was consolidated with the establishment of the 'China desk' by Itamaraty in 2010, and the 'interministerial China group' in 2011.
The study has demonstrated that the interactions among these actors were largely informal, recurrent, but irregular. The relations between these actors were based, above all, on resources exchange. Government and non-government actors contributed information, knowledge, capital, ideas, and political and institutional support to the formulation and implementation of the policy. Despite periods of conflict between domestic actors about how to cope with China, co-operation and co-ordination were the general trends. This challenges the recurrent characterisation of China policy as an area of conflict between pro-China and anti-China camps. The study shows that there were several instances of co-operation between actors with previously contrasting views about China. Furthermore, the change in FIESP's position in 2014 indicates the gradual emergence of a consensus among Brazilian stakeholders about China's strategic relevance, and the need to adopt a proactive policy towards it.
Even though numerous actors were involved in formulating and implementing Brazil's China policy, many others were excluded. Indeed, NGOs, trade unions and universities were rarely involved. This view has been corroborated by Adhemar Mineiro, an economist at the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies (DIEESE) and a member of the NGOs Pre-Salt Observatory and REBRIP. In his view, even though some sectors of civil society worried about the impact of China on Brazil, their voices were rarely heard. 30 Hence, given that China is featuring ever larger in Brazil's domestic and foreign policies in the 21 st century, the challenge lying ahead for Brazilian authorities is to level the playing field so that (Cardoso 2015: 169) .
29.
The Brazilian state has a direct stake in Vale, comprising 5% of shares and 12 golden shares; and an indirect one via government pension funds (Spinetto 2011). 30. Interview by the author, Rio de Janeiro, December 2012.
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